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STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT RULE THAT KELLOGG WAS A BENEFICIARY OF ANY TITLE

INSURANCE POLICY.

FURTHERMORE, THE INSURANCE POLICY

~/AS

NOT PURCHASED

SY HAUETER.
POINT II
ThE COURT DID NOT RULE THAT PARAGRAPH 19 OF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE

CONTRACT MODIFIED THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 18.
POINT III
;HE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT KELLOGG HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE THAYNE

JUDGMENT AND THAT HE PURCHASED THE SELLER'S INTEREST IN THE CONTRACT
FOR GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION.
POINT IV
ThE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
POINT V
7.iE TITLE INSURJ'.\NCE COMPANY BY PAYING THE ENTIRE CLAIM HAS SUBROGATED
~ANY

CLAIM APPELLANT HAD AGAINST ANY THIRD PARTIES.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

c.~RL

HAUETER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs .

Supreme Court No. 15497

11ARVIN E. PEGUIU. AN, WILMA J.
?EGUILLAN, his wifs; FRANCIS
~. KELLOGG, et al.,
Defendants-Respo~dent

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action involves a Complaint and Counterclaim arising
out of a Uniform Real

Estate Contract.

The Complaint is denominated

a quiet-title action and also contained causes of action for fraud.
The Counterclaim was one for termination and forfeiture of the Uniform Real

Estate action by the Respondent for failure of the Appel-

lant to make payments.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS
Judge Bryant H. Croft found no cause of action as to the
/laintiff-Appellants case.
J.aoe payments to

:efault.

Respondent since May, 1974 and was therefore in

However, the Court determined that it 1vould be inequitable

:~forfeit

:net.

The Court ruled that Appellant had not

the Appellant's interest in the Uniform Real Estate Con-

-:-he Court, therefore, entered judgment in favor of Respondent

.,, the sum cf Sl ,95•J .00 For oack pa;ments, plus 5750.00 as reasonable
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Kellogg seeks to have affirmed the District
Court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about April

24, 1972, Marvin E. Peguillan and Wilma

J. Peguillan, his wife, sold their real

property at 1463 South 10th

East, Salt Lake City, Utah (which property is the subject of this
action) to John C. Larsen, pursuant to a Uniform Real
(Exhibit I-P).

Estate Contrac

On June 20, 1972, John C. Larsen assigned the Buyer

interest in said property to the Appellant.

On July 11, 1972, Marv

E. Peguillan and Wilma J. Peguillan conveyed the Seller's interest
in said real estate c0ntract to Francis H. Kellogg, the Respcndent
herein and Josepr1ir:e Kellogg, his \'life, who is now deceased.
time of the sale of the real

Attn:

property from Peguillan to Larsen,

Peguillan provided Larsen with a policy of title insurance in which
Pioneer National Title Insurance Company was the insurer and 1tJesterr
States Title Company '!las Pioneer's authorized agent (Tr. 32, Exhibi:
8-0).

When .A.ppellant purchased the property from John C. Larsen,

Larsen provided a title policy in 111hic~ Pioneer National Title Insurance Company was the insurer and Western States Title Company
11as the authorized agent (Exhibit 19-0).

1

Mr. Ray J . .'Ceys, who

performed the closing for the Larsen-Haueter transaction, testifiec
that Mr. Larsen paid for the title insurance policy (Tr.97).

The

Buyers and Sellers statement prep::ired at the closing \~xn~cits 1.\-:
and 15-0) further indicated that Mr. Larsen paid for said pJlicy.
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At the time of the sale of the property from Peguillan to
Larsen, there was a judgment against Peguillan in favor of rlr. Cleon
~nayne.

Although Appellant claims that there were other judgments

on the property, all of the other judgments claimed were entered
against Peguillan ah.er the property had been sold to Larsen, and
therefore are not li<.:ns on Appel:ant's interest.

The Court indicated

that the question of the other judgments was handled at pre-trial,
that the other parties were not served and that pursuant to stipulation,
and the law, any claim as to other judgment were dismissed (Tr.109).
In fact, judgments entered against a person after he has sold his
interest in the property do not cloud the title to that property.
The Appellant has paid $3,114.61 to clear the Thayne
judgment.

Thereafter, Appellant brought suit against the title in-

surance company which had failed to disclose the judgment on either
title policy, Exhibit 8-D or Exhibit 19-0 for recovery of the sum
of$3,114.61 and other alleged damages.

At trial, a settlement •11as

reached in •11hich the Appellant received $6,000.00 from the title
'nsurance company, consicterably more than the amount expended by
icpeilant. (Tr. 83 and Tr. 108-109).
The essence of the Appellant's claim is that because of
+ne Cleon Thayne judgment, he is entitled to credit against the
1eol

Estate Contract assigned to Respondent Kellogg for the amount

Jf said judgment ($3,114.61), even though he has received payment

'rscn the title company in the sum of 56,000.00 for that judgment.
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There is ample testimony that Respondent Kellogg was
unaware of the Cleon Thayne judgment at the time he purchased the
Seller's interest in the property (Tr. 30-31 and Tr. 55).

There

is further testimony that Respondent Kellogg paid $2,200.00 in
consideration for having the Seller's interest in the Real Estate
Contract assigned to him (Tr. 55) and (Exhibit 10-D).

Despite

Appellant's constant reference, both in the trial and in his brief,
to Kellogg as a "wrong-doer" (see for example Page 14 of Appellant''
Brief), the Court found the facts to be exactly the opposite \Tr.i9
The lower court ruled that the Appellant did not have a
cause of action against Respondent Kellogg as a result of the Cleon
Thayne judgment, and that pursuant to the contractural relationshi;
between the parties, the title insurance company !iad responsibiiity
for making payment to Appellant, which lt did.
It is clear from the Appellant's testimony, that this
action was not brought on behalf of the title insurance company (Tr
Appellant alleges in his Brief (Page 10) that Haueter pai:,
$4,250.00.

This comes from adding the $1,150.00 paid to the credi:

Ap p e 1 1 an t s e e ks o f S 3 , 1 1 4 . 6 l .

No e v i den c e v1 a s i n trod u c e d s how i n9

payments of $4,250.00.
The Appellant has consistently stated in his 3rief, tna'.
Peguillan knew that the judgment existed and that he defrauded the
Appellant (see Brief Pages 4, 5 and 9). ~lthough this issue is not
mai:.erial to the use ~efore the Co'Jlt,
t h e o n l y t e s t i mo n y o n t h e
the J. u d gm en~ at t ri. e

~

j

the record disc11Jses

s s ue i s t h a t ? e g J i 1 l a n

i. ~' e t '1 at ,n e so l ·j

1

t .J

'ti a s

r, o :

t[,,it

3 ·.v 3 r e

;;

r~C'
_a rs en ,\ ~' r . 31. '· . r- •J ,..· •no
·, , '

I
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'.he Appellant's statement on Page 9 that "Peguillan actually defrauded
rarl Haueter when he sold the property to him" is untrue.
did not sell

Peguillan

the property to Haueter and there is no evidence from

iaueter, or anyone else, that Peguillan made any representations to
<aueter, or even knew Haueter prior to the sale from Larsen to Haueter.
ARGUMENT - POINT
THE COURT DID NOT RULE THAT KELLOGG 'IJAS A BENEFICIARY OF ANY TITLE
l~SURIHICE

SY

POLICY.

FURTHERMORE, THE HIS URAN CE POLICY WAS NOT PURCHASED

HAUETE R.
Appel ]ant's first argument is without merit.

not rule that Kellogg
iolicy.

1~as

The Court did

the beneficiary of the title insurance

Neither the record nor the Findings of Fact and Conclusions

supports Appellant's contention.

Furthermore, the Court and the

evidence show conclusively that Haueter did not purchase any title
insurance policy germane to this case.

One title insurance policy

i:,1.Exhibit 8-0) was purchased by Peguillan.
19-D), was pur::hased by Larsen.

The other policy (Exhibit

Appellant's brief argues a con-

;piracy theory which Appellant did not i)rove in trial.

The Court

:1early ruled at the end of the Plaintiff's evidence that Appellant
'aiied to convince the Court that Kellogg knew of the Thayne judgment
:r was engaged in an; conspiracy or collaboration with Peguillan to
::fraud anybody (7r. 95).

Appellant's Point l is obviously intended

a straw-man •11nici1 Appell ant

stan·~S

:1

be

:t

does not reflect i:~e rul in] of the C0ur·t.

'.J;J

and then knocks down.
In 1 i ne with trie fore-

'.•1ng, i t should tie noi:ed ~hat on Page 12 of Appellant's Brief,
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Appellant states that nothing in Paragraph 19 of the UGiform Real
Estate Contract permits a "wrong-doer" the right to "collect twice
under the contract".
Kellogg

1~as

Respondent again wishes to point out that

not a wrong-doer and that al 1 that Kellogg wants is the

payments due to him under the contract.

Kellogg has not received

payment for the sums lawfully due to him once, much less twice.
It is obvious that Appellant is seeking a windfall.

Appellant

received $6,000.00 as compensation for his paying a judgment of
$3,114.61 and is now seeking credit against the contract for an

additional $3,114.61.
ARGUMENT - POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT RULE THAT PARAGRAPH 19 CF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTA7c
CONTRACT MODIFIED THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 18.
Appellant has again set up a straw-man.

The Court ruled

the Uniform Real Estate Contract must be interpreted as a wnole.
That since the expenditure by Appellant on the Thayne judgment was'
totally reimbursed, Appellant could not escape the payments due
the contract.

unc:

In the case before the Court, Peguillan provided

a title pol icy to Larsen which gave full coverage in the event
that the title ·11as not clear.
issue on that policy.

In

~act,

Larsen provided Haueter •11ith a rein part of his arguments to tne

Court, Mr. Minor agreed with the basic principle that the Court
was getting at:
"The Court:

Suppose to simply

1

llusi:rate,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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see the probable situation here, suppose the title insurance
company had said right at the outset,
missed that judgment.
Mr. Miner:

'We sure goofed.

We

We will pay it off, No Sheriff's Sale'.
They didn't do that.

They fought us

right down to the wire with every defense they could find.
The Court:

Suppose they had done that?

i'1r. Miner:

Then, we wouldn't be here today."

Paragraph 18 is not intended to give the Buyer under a
~niform

Real Estate Contract a bonanza.

It is intended to protect

buyer from having to pay more than the contracted-for purchase

1

1rice.

However, if a Buyer is compensated for sums advanced, surely

then he cannot also withhold or suspend payments.
The Seller provided a title insurance policy in accordance
Hith the Uniform Real Estate Contract to guarantee the buyer clear
title.

Surely, a Seller's obligation under the Uniform Real Estate

:ontract cannot be increased by an assignment of the contract by
tne buyer.
The real estate transactions which resulted in this lawsuit
requires the seller of the property to provide the buyer .vith a clear
'.itle.

Both the earnest money agreement (11-P) and the contract

!-P) establish tnat a seller's obligation is met by providing title
"

1

surance.

)'JJ9r

If there is an undisclosed defect in the title, the

has several remedies.

In thisc:i.se the Appellant had decided

:o PJrsue the remedies under tfie ti:le policy he received as part
the transaction.

The Appellant made his election, proceeded with
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

it and l'.'as quite successful.

The buyer is entitled to clear title.

The buyer is not entitled to pursue more than one remed;.

The

Uniform Real Estate Contract does not envision that a buyer recover
more than once for damages resulting from a title encumbrance.
Appellant wishes the Court to provide him t1ith a windfall.

The

He has

received $6,000.00 in compensation for paying $3,114.61 on a judg 8 e·
He now wishes to escape payment under the contract for sums which
are in fact owed.

The result would be highly inequitable, Appellan:

would benefit in the sum of $9,114.61
judgment.

for having paid off a $3,114.

Respondent Kellogg would not receive the funds due to h:·

under the contract.

Such an interpretation of the transactions bef.

the Court is unreasonable.
ARGUMENT -

POi~T

III

THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT KELLOGG HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE THAn
JUDGMENT AND THAT HE PURCHASED THE SELLER'S INTEREST IN THE CONnAC'
FOR GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION.
The Appel l ant ' s i n n u end o to the contrary , the Court c 1ear
ruled that Kellogg had no knowledge of the Thayne judgment and 11as
not a "wrong-doer". (Tr.79)

This finding is amply supported by th:

record (Tr. 30, 31 and 55).

The Appellant in effect, is requestin:

that the Supreme Court make a factual
the lower court.

finding contrar; to that of

The Supreme Sourt has stated on numerous insta!I>

that it will view evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favon.ble t'.) sustaining the aecision.

See for e.<ample.

Oberh~~..L.. vs. C:H1e, No. 14520 File:J C:ecember 21, 1977 and ~2:.'.
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11 .

Bowen, 543 P. 2d 1349 (1975).

The consideration paid by

?espondent Kellogg was not disputed.

No evidence was introduced

to controvert his testimony that he did not know of the Thayne

;udgment.

The lower court's finding in this regard should be up-

~e 1d .

ARGUMENT - POINT IV
Tiff COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.

The collateral source rule is one which is applicable to
ton cases.

22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages 286, 5206 in explaining the

collateral source rule, states that it is a rule applicable to tort
cases.

See al so footnote 12, 22 Am Ju r. 2nd Damages 284, §204.
Not only does the collateral source rule apply only to

ton cases, but almost always only to health, accident and life

insurance proceeds.

C' See also

See 77 Harvard L. Rev. 741, 742 (Feb. 1964).

"The Collateral Source Rule" 21 Ohio St. L.J. 231, 233:
"An examination of a long line of cases in many of the

jurisdictions indicates that the doctrine has been applied in
the following types of situations:

(l) salary received by tne

1:

injured person during his period of disability; (2) pensions,

1c

whether retirement or disability, received as a result of the
injuries; (3) insurance proceeds-death, hospitalization, medical

n>

~

care, etc.; (4) hospital and ,11edical care furnished gratuitously."
The cases cited by Appellant are traditional tort cases
irising from automobile accidents.
1 cp1y

The collateral source rule does

':o such cases, but not to contractual

cases as the one before
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the Court.
Furthermore, in the collateral source cases, the insured
paid for the policy or had the right pursuant t_o an employment arrar
ment of his own.
In this case, the insurance was provided by the seller tc
cover title defects.

It is not a collateral benefit, but one aris'·

directly from the transaction in question.
Th e c o 1 1 a t e r a l s o u r c e r u 1 e , a s a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h e d o c tr i r:
of mitigating damages and permitting recovery only for actual losse:
should be strictly construed.

ARGUMENT - POINT V
THE

TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY BY PAYING THE ENTIRE CLAIM HAS

TO ANY CLAIM

APP~LLA~T

YAD AGA:NST ANY

-~iRD

SUBROG~.::

PAqT!~5.

Paragraph 3 of the title insurance policy (Exhibit 19-D)
provides, "Whenever the Company shall have settled a claim

under'.~

policy, all rigr1t of subrogation shall vest in the Company Jnaffe::·
by any act of the Insured, and it shall be subrogateci co
en~itled

aga1~st

to all rights and remedies

~hich

the Insured

any person or property in respect to such

iJ.11d

wo~id

~]aim

na~

oe
nav~

tnis

policy not be iss:.ied."
By receiving payment pursuant co that policy fr:w the;,;·
rnsurance company, any claim of the
passed to tne

tit~e

7 h e r u;

,; T h e i; e n e r a 1 r u 1 e

e

ins~ran:e

i
~

s a pt : f

Apps~ia.~<c

Jgains~

a1;1

',,~Jr,g<

ccmpa~y.

s t a t e d i n ad :. m

s t h a t u p o n p a y me n t

J

f

.j -'

a :

J

r . 2 .j

•

~ :

3 2G : ~ . ' · ·

s :; , t :1 e i r s J
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the insurers in the case of co-insurance, is entitled to be subrogated pro-tanto, to any right of action which the insured may have
against the third person, whose negligence or wrongful act caused
the loss."
The Supreme Court of Utah has supported the majority
~osition.

23

In Potomac Insurance Company vs. Nickson 64 Utah 395,

Pac . .+45 (1934) the Court stated:

"The Courts have almost

, unanimously held that when an insurer has paid an entire loss, it is
the only real party in interest."
In State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. vs. Farmers Insurance bchange,
22

U. 2d 183 (1969), the Supreme Court stated:
"Subrogation springs from equity concluding that one
having been reimbursed for a specific loss should not be
entitled to a second reimbursement therefor." Id at 184.
The recogGized law is also stated in 13 ALR 3d 229, 248 §6(a):
"ln most of the cases wherein the question has arisen or
been commented upon, it has been held or recognized that where
a property loss caused by the wrongful act of a third person
~as

been fu1iy paid by insurance the insured cannot maintain

an action in his own name against the tortfeasor to recover
for the loss, on the theory that the insured has no interest
in the claim, i1is insurer being subrogated to all his rights
ther-ein."
Numerous courts have held that when an insurance company pays
i

10os in full, thc.t only the insuranc2 company has the right to bring

' iction against a thira µarty who caused the loss.

See United State•
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vs. Aetna Insurance Company 338 U.S. 366 (1949);

Sha~ vs.~

Blackey Plumbing 81 Heating Co._ 264 N.C. 456, 142 SE 2d 18\1965);
Great Amer i can I r. s u r . Co . vs . Watt 2_, 0 k l a . 3 9 3 P . 2 d 2 3 6 ( 1 9 6 4) ; anc
Campbell vs. Campbell, 172 Kan. E40, 243 P. 2d 197 (i952).
Any claim of the Appellant therefore passes tc the t1t:e

.I

insurance company, and Appellant looses any right to use the $3,114.:,
as an offset against the amount aue to

Responde~t.

CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly determined that Appellant was
not entitled to claim the sum of $3,114.El as an offset and that
ll.ppellant was delinquent in payments totalling $1,950.00.

Jf the trial court

s~o~la

Respect~ully

therefore te affirme1.

submitted:

920 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111
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